























A study of the “Wisdom of Crowds” theory
Tadashi OKANO
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to review the theory of the “Wisdom of Crowds” as it applies to system design. This 
theory is used to collectively guess outcomes in ambiguous or unknown situations. It claims that forecasters are 
able to get accurate predictions by examining the opinions of diverse and independent groups, even if those groups 
are immature. There are two approaches to this field: informatics and epistemic. However, there seems to be no 
established theory to explain this phenomenon. In this paper, I classified “Wisdom of Crowds” systems into the 
“direct” and “indirect” types. In addition, I reconsidered respective natures by examining the experimental results of 
preceding studies. The direct type is based on systems that collect insights made independently and directly through 
voting or a questionnaire. In experiments of the direct type, when making predictions, if forecasters are given hints, 
the collective prediction becomes inaccurate. However, in indirect-type experiments, in spite of such information, 
forecasters' collective predictions are correct. Accordingly, I observed the structure of the prediction market and 
pointed out principles that led to its effects.　Prediction markets are futures markets for forecasting event outcomes. 
For example, they predict whether candidates or parties will win an election. Only forecasters who meet definite 
conditions are able to participate in dealings. These conditions are that this forecaster makes different predictions 
than trading partners, and that others trust these predictions. Therefore, the price of a prediction market is an 
aggregation of equilibriums between different convictions. Furthermore, the dependence tendency, which makes 
collective prediction inaccurate because of authoritative information, is neutralized. This suggests the possibility that 
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　図 2 は Lorenz らチューリッヒ工科大学の研究グルー
プによって行われた、独立した推計の集約（群衆の叡智）
と他者の推計を知った上での推計の集約の効果の比較に
関する実験の結果である（Lorenz et.al 2011, Rauhut& 
Lorenz 2011）。






































収束については aggregated info と同様である。しかし、
予測値は最終的には no info に抜かれるものの、かなり
の精度を早期に達成し、また維持している。各自の回答
への確信度は full info が最も高く、aggregated info も
同様に高いが、no info は大きく下がる。また、回を重































































































































































































正解率 10 人 100 人 1000 人 5000 人
50.5% 38.9% 50.0% 61.2% 75.6%
51% 40.2% 54.0% 72.6% 91.9%
51.5% 41.4% 57.9% 82.0% 98.2%






























































































































































































































①－ 1 制度内操作 : 後述の「予測市場」であればわざと
特定の予測証券を高騰させるなど 5）。

































































































 まず参加者は Bush や Dukakis ら候補者全員（この場
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　図 4 は予測市場における一般的な構造の整理である。























































































































































































1 ） A n d e r s o n  2 0 0 6 ,  L a n d e m o r e & M e r c i e r  2 0 1 2 , 

















4） コンドルセ原理による“Wisdom of Crowds”モデルとして
は List（2012）など。
5） 上記課題のうち、①－ 1 の意図的な操作に対しての頑健性
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